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This paper discusses some models of Imprecise Probability Theory obtained by propagating
uncertainty in risk analysis when some input parameters are stochastic and perfectly observable,
while others are either random or deterministic, but the information about them is partial and is rep-
resented by possibility distributions. Our knowledge about the probability of events pertaining to the
output of some function of interest from the risk analysis model can be either represented by a fuzzy
probability or by a probability interval. It is shown that this interval is the average cut of the fuzzy
probability of the event, thus legitimating the propagation method. Besides, several independence
assumptions underlying the joint probability–possibility propagation methods are discussed and
illustrated by a motivating example.
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some inputs or parameters of the model are ill-known.
There are two basic reasons why such parameters or inputs cannot be assigned precise
values. First, some quantities are subject to intrinsic variability. For instance, when pre-
dicting the eﬀect of radioactivity pollution on the health of people, it is clear that this eﬀect
depends on the particulars of individuals (their weight, for instance), and such character-
istics diﬀer from one individual to another. Another reason for uncertainty is the plain
lack of knowledge about relevant parameters. This lack of knowledge may stem from a
partial lack of data, either because this data is impossible to collect, or too expensive to
collect, or because the measurement devices have limited precision, or yet because only
human experts can provide some imprecise information.
Under such a situation, the traditional attitude was to represent each and every ill-
known parameter or input by means of a probability distribution, for instance resorting
to Laplace principle of Insuﬃcient Reason that prescribes the use of uniform distributions
in the absence of information. A more reﬁned approach is the appeal to subjective prob-
ability distributions, whereby additive degrees of belief are supplied by experts via an
exchangeable betting procedure. However, several scholars have complained that predic-
tions obtained under such assumptions were generally not conservative and can only be
attached a limited trust. Indeed, this purely probabilistic view has the major defect of
not taking the idea of lack of knowledge for granted, and confuses it with the variability
phenomenon. It seems that part of the controversies between subjective and objective
probabilities are due to this confusion. Indeed, a variable quantity, if precisely observable,
can faithfully be modeled by a single probability distribution built from the observation of
frequencies. However a ﬁxed but ill-known quantity is more naturally modeled in terms of
partial lack of knowledge, for instance by means of conﬁdence intervals, where conﬁdence
levels are subjectively assessed.
More often than not, the uncertainty pervading parameters and inputs to a mathemat-
ical model is not of a single nature, namely, randomness as objective variability, and
incomplete information may coexist, especially due to the presence of several, heteroge-
neous sources of knowledge, as for instance statistical data and expert opinions. In the last
thirty years, a number of uncertainty theories have emerged that explicitly recognized
incompleteness as a feature distinct from randomness. These theories have proposed non-
additive set-functions which most of the time combine set-valued and probabilistic repre-
sentations. The most general setting is the one of imprecise probabilities developed at
length by Peter Walley [35]. In this theory, sets of probability functions capture the notion
of partial lack of probabilistic information. Slightly more restrictive is the theory of evi-
dence, initiated by Dempster [9], an approach relying on the notion of random set, each
set-valued realization representing a plainly incomplete information item. The set-func-
tions generated in this mathematical framework were further exploited by Shafer [32]
and Smets [33], within a purely subjectivist, non-statistical approach to uncertain evidence.
Even more restrictive is the framework of possibility theory, where pieces of information
take the form of fuzzy sets of possible values [39], which can be interpreted as consonant
(nested) random sets. The merit of this framework lies it its great simplicity, which enables
incomplete probabilistic information on the real line to be encoded in the form of fuzzy
intervals [15,13]. Possibility distributions can also straightforwardly accommodate linguis-
tic information on quantitative scales. All such theories are coherent with each other, in
the sense that they all represent upper and lower probability bounds, thus proposing a
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especially interested in the joint uncertainty propagation through mathematical models
involving quantities respectively modeled by probability and possibility distributions. Dif-
ferent types of uncertain quantities can be considered:
1. Random variables observed with total precision. This is the standard case in probabi-
listic modelling, where only variability is present.
2. Deterministic parameters whose value is imprecisely known. Our information about it
can be modeled by
2a. A random variable: when there is a random error in the measurement of this deter-
ministic value.
2b. A set: when the information about the parameter is the fact that it lies in a given
range.
2c. A fuzzy set, interpreted as a possibility distribution, when the information about
the parameter is linguistic (like ‘‘the temperature is high’’).
2d. A nested family of conﬁdence intervals supplied by an expert along with the corre-
sponding levels of conﬁdence. This case like the previous one can be modeled by a
possibility distribution.
2e. A random set: when the random error in the measurement goes along with a sys-
tematic error taking the form of a perception interval.3. Imprecisely observed random variables: in this case variability and incompleteness
come together because each observation in a statistic is set-valued by lack of precision,
due to a limitation of the observation device.
In cases 2b–d, the natural tool for representing uncertainty is a possibility distribution –
a binary one in case 2b. The fact that cases 1 and 2a can be modeled by a probability
distribution should not hide the fact that in case 2a randomness does not pertain to the
observable, but to the measurement device. So, this case could be captured more naturally
by conﬁdence intervals, enclosing the ill-known ﬁxed value, and derived from the statisti-
cal analysis of the observations. Case 2e extends this situation to when the measurement
device produces set-valued (imprecise) observations of a ﬁxed ill-known quantity. It is
formally similar to case 3, but in the latter, the observed quantity is subject to intrinsic
variability.
If a mathematical model involves both random variables and imprecisely known
parameters, the predictions are likely to take the form of a fuzzy random variable, which
is a random variable taking fuzzy sets as values. Fuzzy random variables have been intro-
duced in slightly diﬀerent settings (see [20] for an overview). The original motivation
stemmed from putting together random variables and linguistic variables introduced by
Zadeh [38]. However, a special case of a fuzzy random variable is a random set, and
not all fuzzy sets come from linguistic data, since for instance possibility distributions
are fuzzy sets that can encode nested families of conﬁdence intervals. Fuzzy random vari-
ables can be generated by computing a function whose arguments involve random vari-
ables and possibilistic variables without referring to linguistic information [21].
The aim of this paper is to describe basic principles underlying the combination of these
three sources of information for the purpose of uncertainty propagation. An important
aspect of the discussion concerns the way to represent knowledge about heterogeneous
variables. We provide three diﬀerent approaches to jointly propagate probability distribu-
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events. Each one of these propagation models reﬂects a particular situation. We analyze
the relations among these models, and relate them with other models in the literature. Sec-
tion 2 provides the necessary technical background. Section 3 presents an example that
will illustrate how the same possibility distribution can be interpreted diﬀerently in diﬀer-
ent situations. Its combination with the same probability measure leads us to diﬀerent
propagation models. In particular, the case when a random quantity is described by a pos-
sibility measure is distinguished from the case when a deterministic (constant) value is
ill-known. In Section 4, we consider the joint propagation of subjective possibilistic infor-
mation and well-observed random variables. We show that it generates a fuzzy random
variable in Section 5, where we prove that the imprecise probability intervals of events
obtained in the previous section are average intervals of the fuzzy probabilities generated
by a higher order approach. In Section 6, we consider the joint propagation of random
and deterministic but ill-known quantities. Section 7 provides a more general propagation
framework. We end the paper with some concluding remarks and open problems.
2. Preliminaries and notation
In this section, some deﬁnitions needed in the rest of the paper are recalled. A fuzzy set
F is identiﬁed with a membership function from a ﬁnite set S to the unit interval. The value
F(s) is the membership grade of element s in the fuzzy set. A fuzzy set is not empty if its
membership function is normalized, that is, F(s) = 1 for some element s. In this paper, a
fuzzy set is interpreted as a possibility distribution p associated to some unknown quantity
x. Then p(s) is interpreted as the possibility that x = s. Throughout the paper, we will use
the notation p to denote a possibility distribution and – the membership function of – its
associated fuzzy set. A random set on S is deﬁned by a mass assignment m which is a prob-
ability distribution on the power set of S. We assume that m assigns a positive mass only to
a ﬁnite family of subsets of S called the set F of focal subsets. Generally m(;) = 0 andP
ESmðEÞ ¼ 1. A random set induces set functions called plausibility and belief measures,
respectively denoted by Pl and Bel, and deﬁned by Shafer [32] as follows:
PlðAÞ ¼
X
E\A6¼;
mðEÞ; ð1Þ
BelðAÞ ¼
X
EA
mðEÞ: ð2Þ
These functions are dual to each other in the sense that Pl(A) = 1  Bel(Ac), where Ac
denotes the complement of A in S. The possibility distribution induced by a mass assign-
ment m is deﬁned as pmðsÞ ¼
P
E:s2EmðEÞ. It is the one-point coverage function of the ran-
dom set. Generally m cannot be recovered from pm. However if the set of focal sets F is
nested, then the information conveyed by m and pm is the same. In this case the plausibility
measure is called a possibility measure and is denoted P, while the belief function is called
a necessity measure and is denoted N. It can be checked that
PðA [ BÞ ¼ maxðPðAÞ;PðBÞÞ; NðA \ BÞ ¼ minðNðAÞ;NðBÞÞ; ð3Þ
PðAÞ ¼ max
s2A
pmðsÞ; NðAÞ ¼ min
s 62A
ð1 pmðsÞÞ: ð4Þ
86 C. Baudrit et al. / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 45 (2007) 82–105Suppose that p(s1) = 1P p(s2)P   P p(sn)P p(sn+1) = 0, and Ei = {s1, . . . , si}, then
mðEiÞ ¼ pðsiÞ  pðsiþ1Þ; 8i ¼ 1; . . . ; n: ð5Þ
These set-functions can be interpreted as families of probability measures, even if this view
does not match the original motivations of Shafer [32] and Smets [33] for belief functions
nor the ones of Zadeh [39] for possibility theory. Let P be a set of probability measures on
S. They induce upper and lower probability functions respectively deﬁned by
P ðAÞ ¼ sup
Q2P
QðAÞ; P ðAÞ ¼ inf
Q2P
QðAÞ: ð6Þ
The set of probability measures dominated by an upper probability P* is denoted by
PðP Þ ¼ fQ; P ðAÞP QðAÞ; 8A  Sg. If the upper probability measure P* is generated
by the familyP, thenPðP Þ is generally a proper superset ofP. In the case of a plausibility
function Pl, the setPðPlÞ of probability functions dominated by Pl is not empty and it gen-
erates lower and upper probability functions that coincide with the belief and plausibility
functions, i.e.
PlðAÞ ¼ sup
P2PðPlÞ
P ðAÞ; BelðAÞ ¼ inf
P2PðPlÞ
P ðAÞ: ð7Þ
This view of belief and plausibility functions as lower and upper probabilities was actually
originally put forward by Dempster [9] using a set-valued mapping C from a probability
space ðX;A; P Þ to S (yielding a random set), whereA is an algebra of measurable subsets
of X. For simplicity, assume "x 2 X,C(x)5 ;. A selection from C is a function f from X
to S such that "x 2 X, f(x) 2 C(x). The set of measurable selections from C is denoted
S(C), and we write f 2 S(C) for short. Each selection f yields a probability measure Pf
on S such that Pf (A) = P(f
1(A)). Now deﬁne the following upper and lower probabilities:
P ðAÞ ¼ sup
f2SðCÞ
Pf ðAÞ; P ðAÞ ¼ inf
f2SðCÞ
Pf ðAÞ: ð8Þ
Let the upper and lower inverse images of subsets A  S be measurable subsets A* and A*
of X deﬁned by A* = {x,C(x) \ A5 ;}, A* = {x,C(x)  A}. Deﬁne the mass assignment
mC on S by mC(E) = P({x,C(x) = E}). Then belief and plausibility functions are retrieved
as follows:
P ðAÞ ¼ P ðAÞ ¼ PlCðAÞ ¼
X
E\A 6¼;
mCðEÞ; ð9Þ
P ðAÞ ¼ P ðAÞ ¼ BelCðAÞ ¼
X
EA
mCðEÞ: ð10Þ
So, the approach by mass assignments, the one using selection functions, and the one using
multiple valued mappings are equivalent, as to the probability bounds they induce on events.
A fuzzy random variable is a generalization of the Dempster setting [9] to when the set-
valued mapping C is changed into a fuzzy set-valued mapping U. It is supposed that
"x 2 X,U(x) is a normalized fuzzy set of S. To each fuzzy subset F of S with membership
function pF is attached a probability mass mU(F) = P({x,U(x) = F}).
3. Joint probability–possibility propagation: A motivating example
As indicated in the introduction of this work, our ﬁnal goal is to propose a framework
for the propagation of three types of information: precise information about a random
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information about a random variable. A possibility distribution can model imprecise
information about a ﬁxed unknown parameter and it can also serve as an approximate
representation of incomplete observation of a random variable. Although the same possi-
bility distribution can describe two diﬀerent types of information, the way in which it must
be combined with a probability distribution representing a random variable will be diﬀer-
ent in each case. Let us provide a simple example that illustrates these diﬀerent situations.
A game consists of two steps. In the ﬁrst step, we can choose one of two keys. One of
them opens a safe containing a reward worth 1000 euros. The other key does not open
anything. The second step is partially unknown. It leads either to a win of at least 700
euros, else a possibly smaller reward of at least 50 euros. A more exact evaluation cannot
be given.
A random variable, X, represents the reward obtained in the ﬁrst step. It takes the val-
ues 0 or 1000, each of them with probability 0.5. More precisely, the results of the key
experiment are x1 = ‘‘the chosen key opens the safe’’ and x2 = ‘‘the chosen key does
not open the safe’’, and the variable is X : fx1;x2g ! R deﬁned as X(x1) = 1000 and
X(x2) = 0.
Let the quantity Y : X! R denote the reward in the second step. We can model our
knowledge about Y(x1) and Y(x2) by means of the necessity measure:
Nðð50;1ÞÞ ¼ 1; Nðð700;1ÞÞ ¼ 0:5:
It contains the same information as the possibility distribution:
pðxÞ ¼
1 if x > 700;
0:5 if 50 < x 6 700;
0 if x 6 50:
8><
>:
Alternatively, it can be described by the random set with mass assignment
m((50,1)) = 0.5, m((700,1)) = 0.5.
Three possible scenarios articulate the second step with respect to the ﬁrst one.
(a) Whether the additional reward depends on the chosen key or not is unknown.
(b) The additional reward is an (ill-known) constant y0, independent from the chosen
key.
(c) If the chosen key opens the safe, then an additional reward (in addition to the 1000
initial euros) worth more than 700 euros is received. If the chosen key does not open
the safe, there will be a consolation prize worth more than 50 euros.
In this paper, there is a given underlying probability space ðX;F; P Þ. The random var-
iable X : X! R is known. There is also some information about the second reward Y. In
each of the three cases, the incomplete information about Y is determined by the same pos-
sibility distribution, p, but a diﬀerent type of information is given in each case. Yet, we do
not know how Y : X! R is deﬁned. For each element x in the initial space, we cannot
determine each image, Y(x). Thus, we can neither determine the probability distribution
P(X,Y), nor the probability measure induced by T, PT. But we shall represent the available
information about them by means of upper probability measures.
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nario. We shall see that the available information about the probability distribution of T is
diﬀerent in each situation.
(a) Here the link between X and Y is unknown. In particular, we do not know whether
the second reward Y is a constant (independence) or not (total dependence). However, we
can model our knowledge about the value of this reward by means of a (constant) fuzzy
random variable ~Y : fx1;x2g ! ~PðRÞ that associates to both results about the key the
same fuzzy set ~Y0 with distribution p (the possibility distribution above), as we have got
the same information about Y(x1) and Y(x2). Here, we must combine the precise informa-
tion about a random variable (the value of the ﬁrst reward) with an independent incom-
plete information about another one (the value of the second reward). If the chosen key
opens the safe, the total reward is, surely, greater than 1050 euros. In addition, with prob-
ability at least 0.5, it is greater than 1700 euros. If the key does not open the safe, the total
reward is, surely, greater than 50 euros. In addition it is greater than 700 euros with prob-
ability at least 0.5. In other words, the possibility that T(x1) = t is
p1ðtÞ ¼
0:5 if t 2 ð1050; 1700;
1 if t 2 ð1700;1Þ;
0 otherwise:
8><
>:
And the possibility that T(x2) coincides with t is
p2ðtÞ ¼
0:5 if t 2 ð50; 700;
1 if t 2 ð700;1Þ;
0 otherwise:
8><
>:
For an arbitrary event A, the probability PT(A) = P(T 2 A) is
P ðT 2 AÞ ¼
X2
i¼1
PðT 2 AjX ¼ xiÞ  P ðX ¼ xiÞ;
where P(T 2 AjX = xi) is dominated by Pi(A) (the possibility measure associated to pi).
Indeed, since the process driving the choice of the additional reward is unknown, all that
is known about T is of the form X þ ~Y 0 ¼ xi þ ~Y 0, a fuzzy set with distribution pi. Hence,
P(T 2 A) is dominated by P aðAÞ ¼
P2
i¼1P ðX ¼ xiÞPiðAÞ. In the example, P a is the possibil-
ity measure associated to the mass assignment
maðð1700;1ÞÞ ¼ maðð1050;1ÞÞ ¼ maðð700;1ÞÞ ¼ maðð50;1ÞÞ ¼ 1=4:
It can be obtained via Dempster’s rule applied to the probability PX attached to X and the
possibility p describing Y, followed by a projection on T = X + Y. This fact points out
that even if the relation between X and Y is unknown, the pieces of information about
them are independent. P a corresponds to the possibility distribution
paðtÞ ¼
0 if t 6 50;
0:25 if t 2 ð50; 700;
0:5 if t 2 ð700; 1050;
0:75 if t 2 ð1050; 1700;
1 if t > 1700:
8>>><
>>>>:
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ﬁxed number, i.e. Y(x1) = Y(x2) = y0. So, we have more information about T than in the
previous case: we know that the reward in the second step is ﬁxed (it does not depend on
the chosen key.) Hence we have the following information about the conditional probabil-
ity values P(T = tjY = y):
P ðT ¼ tjY ¼ yÞ ¼ P ðX ¼ t  yÞ ¼ 0:5 if t ¼ 1000þ y;
0:5 if t ¼ y:

On the other hand, we know that PðT 2 AÞ ¼ RyP50 P ðT 2 AjyÞdQY ðyÞ where QY 6 P, that
is
P ðT 2 AÞ 6 P bðAÞ ¼ sup
QY6P
Z
yP50
P ðT 2 AjY ¼ yÞdQY
 
:
This supremum coincides with the Choquet integral of gA(y) = P(T 2 AjY = y) with
respect to P (where P represents the possibility measure associated to the possibility dis-
tribution p.) Hence, using the mass function induced by p:
P bðftgÞ ¼ 0:5 sup
yP50
PX ðt  yÞ þ 0:5 sup
yP700
PX ðt  yÞ ¼
0:25 if t 2 ½50; 700Þ;
0:5 if tP 700;
0 otherwise:
8><
>:
The set-function P b that is obtained is not necessarily a possibility measure (since
suptP

bðT ¼ tÞ < 1), nor a belief function. In Section 5, we will show that P b is dominated
by P a (it represents more precise information), even if, as shown in the table below,
paðtÞ ¼ P að½0; tÞ ¼ P bð½0; tÞ.t [0,50) [50,700) [700,1050) [1050,1700) P1700
supyP50PX([0, t]  y) 0 0.5 0.5 1 1
supyP700PX([0, t]  y) 0 0 0.5 0.5 1
P bð½0; tÞ 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1(c) In this situation the same random process is at work in the result of the two steps.
Now, the information about ðX ; Y Þ : X! R2 should be represented by the multi-valued
map CX ;Y : fx1;x2g ! PðRÞ2 such that CX,Y (x1) = {1000} · (700,1) and CX,Y(x2) =
{0} · (50,1). Each subset so obtained has probability 0.5. All we know about (X,Y) is
that it is a selection of CX,Y. We easily observe that the marginal upper probability of
CX,Y on the Y axis is the possibility measure associated to the possibility distribution p pre-
viously considered. (All we know about the probability distribution of the second reward,
PY, is that it is dominated by this possibility measure.) In this third scenario, we can thus
represent the available information about T = X + Y by means of a random set
CT : X! XðRÞ given by
CT ðx1Þ ¼ 1000þ ð700;1Þ ¼ ð1700;1Þ and CT ðx2Þ ¼ ð50;1Þ;
each with probability 0.5. (If the chosen key opens the safe, the total reward is surely great-
er than 1700 euros. If it does not open it, we only know that the total reward is greater
than 50 euros.) In this case, our information about the probability distribution of T can
be represented by the basic assignment:
90 C. Baudrit et al. / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 45 (2007) 82–105mcðð1700;1ÞÞ ¼ 1=2 ¼ mcðð50;1ÞÞ:
The upper probability associated to mc, P

c , is a possibility measure that neither dominates
nor is dominated by the ﬁrst upper probability measure, P a.
As we have stated at the beginning of the paper, our aim is to show how we should com-
bine a probability measure and a possibility measure in diﬀerent settings. In the following
sections, we will describe in detail the three diﬀerent propagation models outlined in this
example. We will show the relationships and the diﬀerences among them. To conclude this
section, let us observe that, in the ﬁrst case (case (a)), we can represent, in a natural way,
the available information about the random variable T by a fuzzy random variable. It
takes several diﬀerent ‘‘values’’ (images), each one of them related to a value of X. (When
X takes value xi, the image of the fuzzy random variable is the fuzzy set p
i). We can ﬁnd in
the literature diﬀerent models to represent the probabilistic information provided by a
fuzzy random variable. In next section we will show the relations between the plausibility
measure here deﬁned, P a, and each of those models.
4. When the joint propagation of probability and possibility yields a fuzzy random variable
This section systematizes the situation of scenario (a) in the motivating example. Let us
now consider a random variable X : X! R, that takes the values x1, . . . ,xm with respec-
tive probabilities p1, . . . ,pm. Let us assume that we know these values and probabilities. Let
us consider, on the other hand, another variable, Y : X! R imprecisely known. Let us
suppose we have the same information about all its images Y(x), and that it is given by
means of ‘‘conﬁdence sets’’, which are cuts of a fuzzy set ~Y 0. Namely, we will assume that
there is a family of nested sets, A1      Aq, with their respective conﬁdence levels,
1  a1P   P 1  aq. The available information about Y(x) takes the form of lower
probability bounds:
P ðAjÞP 1 aj; j ¼ 1; . . . ; q:
These inequalities reﬂect information given by an expert: ‘‘the value Y(x) belongs to the
set Aj with a conﬁdence degree 1  aj’’. (For instance, if q = 1 and a1 = 0 we should reﬂect
that the expert only knows the range of Y, not anything else.) Notice that we have ‘‘pure
probabilistic’’ information about X, which may reﬂect a phenomenon of variability and
‘‘possibilistic’’ information about Y because of the nested structure of conﬁdence sets.
However, even if the knowledge ~Y 0 about Y does not depend on a random phenomenon,
the actual value of Y may ﬂuctuate according to the value of X. There is no information
about this possible (objective) dependence between X and Y, but the source of information
about X (standard statistical data) is independent from the source of information about Y
(a human expert).
Following [15] (ﬁnite universes) and [3,4] (general setting), the set of probability mea-
sures {P : P(Aj)P 1  aj, "j = 1, . . . ,q} coincides with the set of probability measures that
are dominated by the following possibility measure, P:
PðAÞ ¼
a1 if A \ A1 ¼ ;;
ajþ1 if A \ Aj 6¼ ;; A \ Ajþ1 ¼ ;; j ¼ 1; . . . ; q 1;
1 if A \ Aq 6¼ ;:
8><
>: ð11Þ
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mðAjÞ ¼ mj ¼ ajþ1  aj; j ¼ 0; . . . ; q;
where A0 ¼ R  A1      Aq1  Aq and 0 = a0 6 a1 6    6 aq 6 aq+1 = 1.
Therefore, for variable X, there is randomness but total precision, while the information
regarding Y is incomplete: especially Y is possibly tainted with variability, but its relation-
ship to X is just unknown.
Let us now consider the random variable T = f(X,Y), where f : R2 ! R is a known
mapping. Now we need to represent the available information about the probability
measure induced by T : X! R. We easily observe that, when X takes the value xi (i 2
{1, . . . , m}), T is in the set Tij = f(xi,Aj) = {f(xi,y) : y 2 Aj} with a conﬁdence degree
1  aj. Recalling again the results from [4,15], we observe that, for each i 2 {1, . . . ,m},
the set of probability measures {P : P(Tij)P 1  aj, "j = 1, . . . ,q} coincides with the set
of probability measures dominated by the possibility measure Pi given by
PiðAÞ ¼
a1 if A \ T i1 ¼ ;;
ajþ1 if A \ T ij 6¼ ;; A \ T iðjþ1Þ ¼ ;; j ¼ 1; . . . ; q 1;
1 if A \ T iq 6¼ ;:
8><
>:
This possibility measure is related to P as follows. Its possibility distribution, pi, is
obtained from p (the possibility distribution of P) by the extension principle of fuzzy
set theory [38]:
piðtÞ ¼ sup
y:f ðxi;yÞ¼t
pðyÞ; 8t 2 R: ð12Þ
It is the membership function of the fuzzy set f ðxi; ~Y 0Þ. We also observe that Pi is deter-
mined by the mass assignment mi:
miðRÞ ¼ m0 ¼ a1; miðT ijÞ ¼ mj ¼ ajþ1  aj; j ¼ 1; . . . ; q 1;
miðT iqÞ ¼ mq ¼ 1 aq:
Thus, according to the probability distribution of X and our information about y, the
probability measure of T is imprecisely determined by means of the basic assignment
mT that assigns the probability mass mij = pimj to each focal T ij ðT i0 ¼ R; 8i). The associ-
ated plausibility and belief functions are given by the expressions:
PlT ðAÞ ¼
X
ði;jÞ:A\T ij 6¼;
mij; 8A; BelT ðAÞ ¼
X
ði;jÞ:T ijA
mij; 8A:
This view comes down to considering the random fuzzy set, assigning to each realization xi
the fuzzy set pi, as a standard random set, using a two-stepped procedure: ﬁrst select a fuz-
zy set with membership function pi with probability pi and then select the a-cut Aj of p
i
with probability mj. Besides, we can observe that the plausibility measure describing our
information about T coincides with the arithmetic mean of the possibility measures Pi
(weighted by the probabilities of the diﬀerent values of X,) i.e.
PlT ðAÞ ¼
X
ði;jÞ:A\T ij 6¼;
mij ¼
Xm
i¼1
X
j:A\T ij 6¼;
pimj ¼
Xm
i¼1
piP
iðAÞ; 8A: ð13Þ
92 C. Baudrit et al. / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 45 (2007) 82–105Similarly the belief function BelT coincides with the arithmetic mean of the necessity
measures Ni (similarly weighted) i.e.
BelT ðAÞ ¼
X
ði;jÞ:T ijA
mij ¼
Xm
i¼1
X
j:T ijA
pimj ¼
Xm
i¼1
piN
iðAÞ; 8A: ð14Þ
These expressions are special cases of deﬁnitions independently proposed by Dubois
and Prade [11] in the mid-eighties, Yen [34] in the early nineties for fuzzy events. Taking
into account the properties of possibility measures as upper envelopes of sets of probabil-
ity measures (see [15], for ﬁnite universes and [3,4,24], for the general case), we get the
equalities:
PlT ðAÞ ¼ sup
Xm
i¼1
piP iðAÞ : P i 2 PðPiÞ; i ¼ 1; . . . ;m
( )
; ð15Þ
BelT ðAÞ ¼ inf
Xm
i¼1
piP iðAÞ : P i 2 PðPiÞ; i ¼ 1; . . . ;m
( )
: ð16Þ
These equations suggest another probabilistic interpretation of these plausibility and
belief functions, laid bare in case (a) of the example: let us consider an arbitrary event
A. According to our information about Y0, if we observe the value xi for the random var-
iable X, then the probability P(T 2 AjX = xi) that T takes a value in A is less than or equal
to Pi(A), and at least equal to Ni(A). In other words,
NiðAÞ 6 P ðT 2 AjX ¼ xiÞ ¼ P iðAÞ 6 PiðAÞ:
On the other hand, the probability that X takes each value xi is pi. Thus, according to the
Theorem of Total Probability, all we know about the quantity PT(A) = P(T 2 A) is that it
can be expressed as
Pm
i¼1piP iðAÞ, where Pi is a probability measure dominated by Pi, for
each i. Hence, according to Eq. (15), we can interpret the values PlT(A) and BelT(A) as the
most precise bounds (the smallest for PlT(A), the largest for BelT(A)) for the ‘‘true’’ prob-
ability of A, according to the available information.
5. Relationship with existing approaches to fuzzy random variables
At the end of Section 3, we have remarked that a fuzzy random variable could be used
to represent our imprecise knowledge about the random variable T. It was patent in the
previous section since the resulting knowledge about T = f(X,Y) could be obtained by gen-
erating the fuzzy sets f ðxi; ~Y Þ by picking the xi’s randomly, while ~Y is a constant fuzzy set,
as done by Guyonnet et al. [21]. A fuzzy random variable admits as many interpretations
as there are interpretations of fuzzy sets in the literature (see [16] for a detailed descrip-
tion). Next, we are going to brieﬂy review two of these interpretations. According to each
one of them, the information provided by the fuzzy random variable will be summarized in
a speciﬁc way. Thus, we will see how two diﬀerent interpretations can lead us to a classical
model or an order 2 imprecise model, respectively. Our intention in this subsection is to
compare the plausibility–belief model constructed in Section 4 with these two interpreta-
tions. As indicated in the introduction, a fuzzy random variable associates a fuzzy set, to
each possible result of a random experiment. Diﬀerent deﬁnitions of fuzzy random vari-
ables (see for instance [10,22,26] or [30]) diﬀer in the way the classical measurability con-
dition of random variables is transferred to this context.
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In our particular problem, the fuzzy random variable is constructed speciﬁcally as fol-
lows. Let ðX;A; PÞ be a probability space. On the one hand, let us consider a random var-
iable, X : X! R (X represents the observation of a certain characteristic of each element
of X). Let us consider, on the other hand, another random variable Y : X! R. Let us sup-
pose that the available (imprecise) information about Y is given by the fuzzy set associated
to the membership function p : R! ½0; 1. Hence, it deﬁnes a constant mapping,
~Y : X! ~PðRÞ that assigns, to every element of X, the same fuzzy set, p. Thus, for each
x and each y, ~Y ðxÞðyÞ ¼ pðyÞ represents the possibility grade that Y(x) coincides with
y. This scheme illustrates that our knowledge about the image of Y does not depend on
each particular individual, x 2 X. Let us now consider a map f : R2 ! R and the random
variable given as T = f  (X,Y). The available information about T is given by the fuzzy
random variable ~T : X! ~PðRÞ deﬁned as follows:
~T ðxÞðtÞ ¼ sup
fy2R:f ðX ðxÞ;yÞ¼tg
pðyÞ:
Let us assume that the element x of the population is selected. Then, the degree of possi-
bility that the true image T(x) is t coincides with the degree of possibility that Y(x)
belongs to the set {yjf(X(x),y) = t}. Thus, the fuzzy random variable ~T : X! ~PðRÞ rep-
resents the vague information available about the random variable T : X! R. Following
this approach, we can assign, to each event of the ﬁnal space, a fuzzy subset of the unit
interval. This fuzzy quantity reﬂects the (vague) information available about the true prob-
ability of the event.
In [5] the second author proposed a model of this type. Here, we brieﬂy recall how this
model is constructed. Then, we will show the relationship between this model and the plau-
sibility–belief model deﬁned in Section 4. Let us ﬁrst assume that the fuzzy random vari-
able ~T : X! ~PðRÞ represents the following imprecise information about the random
variable T : X! R: for each a > 0, the probability of the event ‘‘T ðxÞ 2 ½~T ðxÞa;
8x 2 X’’ is greater than or equal to 1  a. This is in agreement with the fact that the
possibility distribution associated with ~T is equivalent to stating that for each cut
½~T ðxÞa, the degree of necessity Nð½~T ðxÞaÞP 1 a. Under this interpretation we can
say that, for each conﬁdence level 1  a, the probability distribution associated to T
belongs to the set P~T a ¼ fPT : T 2 Sð~T aÞg, where Sð~T aÞ is the set of selections from the
random set ~T a. Thus, given an arbitrary event A of the ﬁnal space, the probability
PT(A) belongs to the set
P~T aðAÞ ¼ fPT ðAÞ : T 2 Sð~T aÞg ð17Þ
with conﬁdence level 1  a. In [5] the fuzzy set ~P ~T of probability functions, with member-
ship function given by the equation:
~P ~T ðQÞ ¼ supfa 2 ½0; 1 : Q 2 P~T ag; 8Q
is viewed as an imprecise representation of the probability measure PT. In fact, ~P ~T is a pos-
sibility distribution on the space of probability functions. According to the available infor-
mation, the quantity ~P ~T ðQÞ represents the possibility degree that Q coincides with the true
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number ~P ~T ðAÞ, deﬁned as
~P ~T ðAÞðpÞ ¼ supfa 2 ½0; 1 : p 2 P~T aðAÞg; 8p 2 ½0; 1;
represents our imprecise information about the quantity PT(A) = P(T 2 A). Thus, the
value ~P ~T ðAÞðpÞ represents the degree of possibility that the ‘‘true’’ degree of probability
PT(A) is p. De Cooman recently proposed a behavioral interpretation of such fuzzy prob-
abilities [2].
The possibility measure ~P ~T is a ‘‘second order possibility measure’’. We use this term
because it is a possibility distribution deﬁned over a set of probability measures [36]. It
is recalled in the second section that a possibility measure encodes a set of probability mea-
sures (the set of probability measures it dominates). Hence, a second order possibility mea-
sure is associated to a set of (meta-)probability measures, each of them deﬁned, as well,
over a set of probability measures. Thus, a second order possibility measure allows us
to state sentences like ‘‘the probability that the true probability of the event A is 0.5 ranges
between 0.4 and 0.7’’. On the other hand, it is easily checked that the set of values consid-
ered in Eq. (17) is upper bounded by
PlaðAÞ ¼ Pðfx 2 X : ½~T ðxÞa \ A 6¼ ;gÞ
and lower bounded by
BelaðAÞ ¼ Pðfx 2 X : ½~T ðxÞa  AgÞ:Remark 1. In particular, if A is an interval of the form (1, x], and the ﬁnal space is
ﬁnite, then Pla(A) and Bela(A) respectively coincide with the values:
F aðxÞ ¼ Plaðð1; xÞ ¼ P ðfx 2 X : min½~T ðxÞa 6 xgÞ
and
F aðxÞ ¼ Belaðð1; xÞ ¼ Pðfx 2 X : max½~T ðxÞa 6 xgÞ:
In [18], Ferson and Ginzburg represent the imprecise information about PT by the nested
family of sets of probability measures fPðfF a; F agÞga2½0;1. Here PðfF a; F agÞ represents
the set of probability measures obtained from F*a and F

a, i.e., the set:
fQ : F aðxÞ 6 Qð1; x 6 F aðxÞ; 8x 2 Rg:
On the other hand, it is important to notice that the set of probability measures deﬁned by
the pair (Bela,Pla) is, in general, more precise than the set of probability measures induced
by ðF a; F aÞ. In [6] the relationships between both sets of probabilities are studied.
Remark 2. In contrast, for each a 2 (0,1], the set of probability measures P~T a is generally
more precise than the set of probability measures associated to Bela and Pla. Hence, for an
arbitrary event A, the set of values P~T aðAÞ is included in the interval [Bela(A),Pla(A)]. For
ﬁnite universes, it is easily checked that the maximum and the minimum of these sets do
coincide. (This is not true in general, as shown in [28].) On the other hand, the set of values
P~T aðAÞ is not necessarily convex, because (as we checked in [29]) the set of probability
measures P~T a is not so either. Generally speaking, when we replace this set by the set of
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shown in [5]. Anyway, with respect to the information we want to provide with the current
model, these differences are meaningless, because we are only interested in a pair of
bounds (lower and upper) for the probability of every event, and our referential is ﬁnite,
by hypothesis.5.2. The average probability interval
In the literature, second order probability measures are used in general to represent the
information given by an expert. They indicate subjective degrees of belief about the true
probability measure that models a given phenomenon. Here we used a second-order pos-
sibility measure. Kyburg [27] argues that one should not combine regular (especially frequ-
entist) probability values and higher order information. However a result in the form of a
fuzzy subinterval in the unit interval is more diﬃcult to interpret by a user interested in
making a decision on the basis of the probability of an event of interest (like violating a
safety threshold). A probability interval is a simpler concept.
There exists a strong relationship between the plausibility measure deﬁned in Section 4
and the fuzzy set ~P ~T deﬁned in [5]. In actual fact, we shall prove that, for every event A, the
interval [Bel(A),Pl(A)] coincides with the mean value [13] (also called the average level [31])
of the fuzzy set ~P ~T ðAÞ. This result implies, for instance, that, for all x 2 R, the interval
[F*(x),F
*(x)] = [Bel(1,x], Pl(1,x]] (determined from our plausibility measure) coin-
cides with the mean value and the average level of the fuzzy set determined by the nested
family of intervals f½F aðxÞ; F aðxÞga2½0;1 considered by Ferson and Ginzburg [18]. Before
checking these results, we are going to recall the concepts of ‘‘mean value’’ and‘‘average
level’’ of a fuzzy set. In [13], Dubois and Prade deﬁne the ‘‘mean value’’ of a fuzzy number,
p, as the interval:
MðpÞ ¼ fEðP Þ : P 6 Pg;
where E(P) represents the expected value associated to the probability measure P, andP is
the possibility measure associated to the possibility distribution p. That interval represents
the set of possible values for the expectation of the outcome of a certain random experi-
ment. Let us recall that p represents a set of probability measures (the set of probability
measures dominated by P). So,M(p) represents the set of all possible values for the expec-
tation, when we only know that the probability measure that models the random experi-
ment belongs to this set.
On the other hand, Ralescu deﬁnes in [31] the ‘‘average level’’ of a fuzzy number,
p : R! ½0; 1, as the integral:
AðpÞ ¼
Z 1
0
½pa da:
In this formula, it is considered the Kudo-Aumann integral of the multi-valued ‘‘level’’
mapping, Lp : ½0; 1 ! R, with respect to Lebesgue measure (the uniform distribution),
over the unit interval. The ‘‘level’’ multi-valued mapping assigns, to each a in [0,1], the
a-cut of p,
½pa ¼ fx 2 R : pðxÞP ag:
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trapezoidal, its average level coincides with its 0.5-cut. In the general case, the author con-
siders a uniform probability distribution over the class of a-cuts and calculates the
‘‘expected’’ a-cut (it is not a cut, in general).
Let us now prove that, for each event A, the interval [Bel(A),Pl(A)] considered in Sec-
tion 4 coincides with the average level of the fuzzy set ~P ~T ðAÞ of the second order model.
Theorem 5.1. Given an arbitrary event A, the interval [Bel(A),Pl(A)] coincides with the
average level of the fuzzy set ~P ~T ðAÞ.Proof. First of all, let us prove that the average level of the fuzzy set ~P ~T ðAÞ coincides with
the average level of the fuzzy set associated to the nested family of intervals {[Bela(A),
Pla(A)]}a2[0,1]: on the one hand, as recalled before, the following equalities hold:
max P ~T aðAÞ ¼ PlaðAÞ and min P ~T aðAÞ ¼ BelaðAÞ:
Let us notice that we consider the uniform probability distribution on [0,1] and it is non-
atomic. Hence, although the sets in the family fP ~T aðAÞga2½0;1 are not necessarily convex,
the Aumann integral of the multi-valued mapping they determine is indeed an interval.
Thus, the Aumann integral of the multi-valued mapping that assigns the set P ~T aðAÞ to each
a 2 [0,1], coincides with the Aumann integral of the multi-valued mapping that assigns, to
each a 2 [0, 1], the set [Bela(A),Pla(A)]. On the other hand, we can observe that the family
of nested sets fP ~T aðAÞga2½0;1 determines the fuzzy set ~P ~T ðAÞ. In other words, the following
equations are satisﬁed:
½~P ~T ðAÞa  P ~T aðAÞ  ½~P ~T ðAÞa; 8a 2 ½0; 1Þ;
where ½pa ¼ fx 2 R : pðxÞ > ag; and then ~P ~T ðAÞðpÞ ¼ supfa 2 ½0; 1 : p 2 P ~T aðAÞg. So, we
conclude that the average level of the fuzzy set ~P ~T ðAÞ coincides with the Aumann integral:Z 1
0
½BelaðAÞ; PlaðAÞda:
Finally, we easily check that this integral coincides with the closed interval:Z 1
0
BelaðAÞda;
Z 1
0
PlaðAÞda
 
:
(In this last equation, the Lebesgue integral is considered.) According to Eq. (13), the plau-
sibility of an event A, is calculated as follows:
PlðAÞ ¼
Xm
i¼1
X
j:A\T ij 6¼;
pimj: ð18Þ
By the commutative property of the sum, we can write it alternatively as
PlðAÞ ¼
Xq
j¼0
mj
X
i:A\T ij 6¼;
pi
0
@
1
A; ð19Þ
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Now, for each j we can calculate the value PlajðAÞ as follows:
PlajðAÞ ¼ P ðfx 2 X : ~T ajðxÞ \ A 6¼ ;gÞ ¼
X
i:A\T ij 6¼;
pi: ð20Þ
This way, we easily check that the quantity Pl(A) coincides with the Lebesgue integralR 1
0
PlaðAÞda. We should check in an analogous way that Bel(A) coincides with the integralR 1
0
BelaðAÞda. h
This last result improves one in [1], where we only proved that Pl(A) ranges between
Pl1(A) and Pl0(A). Let us provide a direct proof that the interval [Bel(A),Pl(A)] also coin-
cides with the ‘‘mean value’’ of the fuzzy set ~P ~T ðAÞ.
Theorem 5.2. Given an arbitrary event A, the interval [Bel(A),Pl(A)] coincides with the
mean value of the fuzzy set ~P ~T ðAÞ.Proof. The mean value of that fuzzy set is given by the expression:
Mð~P ~T ðAÞÞ ¼
Z
iddP : P 6 P~P ~T ðAÞ
 
;
where P~P ~T ðAÞ represents the possibility measure determined by the fuzzy set
~P ~T ðAÞ. We can
easily check that this mean value is a closed interval. Its minimum and maximum values
respectively coincide with the Choquet integrals of the identity function with respect to
N ~P ~T ðAÞ and P~P ~T ðAÞ. This pair of dual necessity and possibility measures is associated to
the focal sets PT a1 ðAÞ; . . . ;PT aq ðAÞ, with respective mass assignments m1, . . . ,mq. We deduce
that the Choquet integral of the identity map with respect to P~P ~T ðAÞ coincides with the sumPq
j¼0mjmaxPT aj ðAÞ. On the other hand, as we pointed out above, each value maxPT aj ðAÞ
coincides with the plausibility PlajðAÞ. This way, we observe that the maximum of the set
Mð~P ~T ðAÞÞ coincides with the value
Pq
j¼0mjPlajðAÞ. Now, according to Eqs. (18)–(20), we
deduce that maxMð~P ~T ðAÞÞ coincides with Pl(A). We could check, in an analogous way,
that the minimum of the interval Mð~P ~T ðAÞÞ coincides with the value Bel(A). h
The intuitive meaning of this last result is as follows. As explained before, in the second
order imprecise model we represent our imprecise information by a pair of order 2 plau-
sibility–necessity measures. The necessity measure appears in a natural way from conﬁ-
dence levels. Hence, for each a, we assign the lower probability (degree of necessity)
1  a to a set of probability measures. This order 2 necessity measure provides the same
information as its dual possibility measure. Both of them are equivalent to a set of second
order probability measures, as we recalled in Section 5.1. Let us consider a particular sec-
ond order probability measure, P, belonging to this set. Let us also ﬁx an arbitrary event
A. In this setting, we can deﬁne a random variable that takes each value Q(A) with prob-
ability PðfQgÞ.1 If P was the ‘‘correct’’ second order probability measure that models the
second order experiment, then we could state that the ‘‘true’’ probability of A should
coincide with the expectation of this random variable. In the last theorem we have shown
that Bel(A) and Pl(A) respectively coincide with the lower and upper bounds of the set1 For the sake of clarity, we are assuming that the second order probability measure, P, is ‘‘discrete’’.
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bility measure dominated by the pair of (second order) possibility–necessity measures. As
a consequence of this, Bel(A) and Pl(A) represent, in the average, the most precise bounds
for the ‘‘true’’ probability of A, under the available information.
5.3. Relationship with the ‘‘classical’’ model of fuzzy random variables
In the last subsection we have compared our plausibility–belief model with the second
order possibility distribution associated to the fuzzy random variable ~T : This second
order model associates, to each event (crisp subset of the ﬁnal space), a fuzzy set in
the unit interval. However, another point of view in the literature leads to assigning a
(crisp) value of probability to each possible (fuzzy) image of ~T , by considering a fuzzy
random variable as a ‘‘classical’’ measurable mapping. Kra¨tschmer [23] reviews all the
previous deﬁnitions of fuzzy random variables in the literature, and oﬀers a uniﬁed
vision. He considers speciﬁc topologies deﬁned on a certain class of fuzzy subsets of R.
A fuzzy random variable is then a measurable function. This ‘‘classical’’ vision of a fuzzy
random variable viewing it as a measurable function agrees with the interpretation given
by Puri and Ralescu [30]. In that paper, the authors consider that the outcomes of some
random experiments are not numerical ones, but they can be vague linguistic terms. In
this context, the information provided by the fuzzy random variable can be summarized
by means of the probability measure it induces in the ﬁnal space. When the fuzzy random
variable takes a ﬁnite number of diﬀerent linguistic ‘‘values’’, its induced probability is
determined by the mass function. Therefore, it will suﬃce to specify which are the diﬀer-
ent images of the fuzzy random variable and the probability of occurrence of each one of
them. Thus, diﬀerent probability values will be assigned to diﬀerent linguistic labels (for
example, we could generate a model of the following type: the probability that the result
is ‘‘high’’ is 0.5, the probability of being ‘‘average’’ is 0.25 and the probability of being
‘‘low’’ is 0.25).
In our particular problem, the fuzzy random variable, ~T has m diﬀerent images (m dif-
ferent fuzzy sets), one per each value of X. As we assume at the beginning of Section 4, X
takes a ﬁnite number of diﬀerent values, x1, . . . ,xm with respective probabilities p1, . . . ,pm.
In other words, X is a ‘‘simple’’ mapping, X ¼Pmi¼1xiICi , where {C1, . . . ,Cm} is a partition
of X and P(Ci) = pi, "i = 1, . . . ,m. For each i 2 {1, . . . ,m}, and each x 2 Ci, the fuzzy set
~T ðxÞ coincides with the fuzzy set pi, deﬁned from f and p as indicated in Eq. (12). Thus,
the fuzzy random variable ~T takes its m ‘‘values’’ p1, . . . ,pm with respective probabilities
p1, . . . ,pm. These m fuzzy sets and their respective probabilities uniquely determine the
probability distribution induced by ~T , considered as a classical measurable function.
If a question referring to the universe underlying the linguistic values of ~T must be
addressed, of the form ‘‘is T 2 A?’’ , then if the knowledge about ~T is pi, one may provide
the possibility and the necessity degrees of A according to pi. In the fuzzy random setting
here, the belief and plausibility functions deﬁned in the previous section:
PlðAÞ ¼
Xm
i¼1
pi sup
t2A
piðtÞ; 8A;
BelðAÞ ¼
Xm
i¼1
pi inf
t 62A
ð1 piðtÞÞ; 8A
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underlying the random fuzzy set ~T .
6. Joint propagation of probabilistic and ill-known deterministic information
In this section, more information available information about T is available than in
Section 4: now the value of Y is a constant y0, which is only partially known, but of course
does not depend on X. According to case (b) of the motivating example, the information
given by the fuzzy random variable ~T previously deﬁned from P and X is compatible with
our vague knowledge about T. Nevertheless, the new assumption leads to more precise
results.
The random variable X : X! R, again takes known values x1, . . . ,xm with respective
known probabilities p1, . . . ,pm. Let us consider, on the other hand an imprecisely known
ﬁxed number y0 2 R. Let us suppose that our information about y0 is given by means of
subjective ‘‘conﬁdence levels’’. Thus, we will assume that there is a family of nested sets,
A1      Aq, with respective conﬁdence degrees 1  a1P   P 1  aq. As in the previ-
ous section, our information about y0 is given by the possibility measure P in Eq. (11).
Our information about Y is now more precise than in Section 4: Not only is the informa-
tion about Y(x) constant, independent of x but, furthermore we know that the real value
of Y is constant (even if unknown) : Y(x) = y0, "x 2 X. Let us now consider the random
variable T = f(X,y0), where f : R
2 ! R is a known mapping. The objective probability
measure PT attached to T : X! R only depends on X. The random variable T satisﬁes
again all the properties of T in Section 4. Thus, we know that its probability distribution
is dominated by the plausibility measure there deﬁned. But now we know in addition that
Y is constant. So, we will look for a more precise upper probability. In other words, we
will ﬁnd a set function P* that satisﬁes the inequalities:
PT ðAÞ 6 P ðAÞ 6 PlðAÞ; 8A:6.1. Main result
Let us denote by C the ‘‘most precise set we know that contains y0’’. It is a random set
that takes the ‘‘values’’ A0 ¼ R  A1      Aq with respective probabilities
mðRÞ ¼ m0 ¼ a1; mðAjÞ ¼ mj ¼ ajþ1  aj; j ¼ 1; . . . ; q 1; mðAqÞ ¼ mq ¼ 1 aq:
m is the basic mass assignment associated to P. Following [32], each quantity m(C) is
understood to be the fraction of belief that is committed exactly to C, and to nothing smal-
ler. Note that the conditional probability PT(AjAi) is the probability that T 2 A, given that
all we know about y0 is that y0 2 Ai. So we can write it P(T 2 AjC = Aj). Moreover,
PT(Ajy) = P(f(X,Y) 2 Ajy) = P({x 2 X : f(X(x),y) 2 A}). Thus, for each event A, we have
PT ðAÞ ¼ PðT 2 AÞ ¼
Xq
j¼0
P ðT 2 AjC ¼ AjÞ  P ðC ¼ AjÞ
6
Xq
j¼0
supfP ðfx 2 X : f ðX ðxÞ; yÞ 2 AgÞ : y 2 Ajg  mj ¼ P ðAÞ; ð21Þ
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Choquet integral of gA : R! ½0; 1 with respect to P, where gA is given by
gA(y) = P({x 2 X : f(X(x),y) 2 A}), as suggested in the motivating example case (b).
We easily observe that P* is dominated by the plausibility function, Pl deﬁned in Sec-
tion 4: As we check in Eq. (19), Pl can be written as follows:
PlðAÞ ¼
Xq
j¼0
mj
X
i:A\T ij 6¼;
pi
0
@
1
A:
Furthermore, for each j 2 {0, . . . ,q}, the quantity Pi:A\T ij 6¼;pi coincides with the
probability
P ðfx 2 X : f ðX ðxÞ;AjÞ \ A 6¼ ;gÞ:
And we easily check, for each j = 0, . . . ,q, that
P ðfx 2 X : f ðX ðxÞ;AjÞ \ A 6¼ ;gÞP sup
y2Aj
P ðfx 2 X : f ðX ðxÞ; yÞ 2 AgÞ;
since fx 2 X : f ðX ðxÞ;AjÞ \ A 6¼ ;g ¼ [y2Aifx 2 X : f ðX ðxÞ; yÞ 2 Ag. Hence, we have
found an upper probability measure, P*, that dominates PT and is more precise than Pl.
In other words,
PT ðAÞ 6 P ðAÞ 6 PlðAÞ; 8A:
Its dual lower probability measure, P* is given by the formula
P ðAÞ ¼
Xq
j¼0
inffPðfx 2 X : f ðX ðxÞ; yÞ 2 AgÞ : y 2 Ajg  mj; ð22Þ
and it satisﬁes the inequalities
BelðAÞ 6 P ðAÞ 6 PT ðAÞ; 8A:6.2. Relation with second order models
Let us consider, for each y 2 R, the random variable T y : X! R, given by Ty(x) =
f(X(x),y), "x 2 X. We can say that T 2 Sj ¼ fT y : y 2 Ajg with conﬁdence 1  aj,
"j = 1, . . . ,q. Thus, with conﬁdence 1  aj we know that PT belongs to the set
Pj ¼ fPT y : y 2 Ajg:
So, we can describe our information about PT by a family of nested sets of probability
measures. The class of (meta-) probabilities, P, satisfying
PðPjÞP 1 aj; 8j ¼ 1; . . . ; q
coincides with the set of (meta-) probabilities dominated by the (second order) possibility
distribution, ~P , given by
~PðQÞ ¼
a1 if Q 62 P1;
ajþ1 if Q 2 Pj nPjþ1; j ¼ 1; . . . ; q 1:
1 aq if Q 2 Pq:
8><
>:
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5.1. (This is easily checked, as each set Pj is included in PT aj.)
Furthermore, for a particular event A, the probability value PT(A) can be described by
the fuzzy subset of [0,1], ~P ðAÞ:
~P ðAÞðpÞ ¼
a1 if p 62 B1;
ajþ1 if p 2 Bj n Bjþ1; j ¼ 1; . . . ; q 1;
1 aq if p 2 Bq;
8<
:
where {B1, . . . ,Bq} is the family of nested sets deﬁned as
Bj ¼ fPT y ðAÞjy 2 Ajg ¼ fgAðyÞjy 2 Ajg; 8j ¼ 1; . . . ; q
in the sense that ~P ðAÞðpÞ represents the possibility that PT(A) coincides with p, "p 2 [0, 1].
We easily observe that this last fuzzy set is included in P ~T ðAÞ. Moreover, the (ﬁrst order)
model considered in Section 6 coincides with the mean value of this fuzzy set. In other
words, ½P ðAÞ; P ðAÞ ¼ Mð~P ðAÞÞ; 8A, as we prove in the following theorem.
Theorem 6.1. Given an arbitrary event A, the interval [P*(A),P
*(A)] coincides with the
mean value of the fuzzy set ~P ðAÞ.Proof. Let us consider an arbitrary event, A. First of all, let us notice that the possibility
distribution ~P ðAÞ is associated to the mass assignment m~P ðAÞ:
m~PðAÞð½0; 1Þ ¼ m0 ¼ a1;
m~PðAÞðBjÞ ¼ mj ¼ ajþ1  aj; j ¼ 1; . . . ; q 1;
m~PðAÞðBqÞ ¼ mq ¼ 1 aq:
Furthermore, let us observe that all the focal subsets have maximum and minimum
value: B0 = [0,1] is a closed interval and Bj is ﬁnite, for all j 2 {1, . . . ,q} (each Bj can be
written as a set of elements of the form
P
i2I pi, with I  {1, . . . ,m}).
Thus, Mð~PðAÞÞ has a maximum and a minimum value (the maximum value is the
expected value of the probability measure that associates the mass mj to maxBj,
"j = 0, . . . ,q. The minimum is the expectation of the probability measure that associates
the mass mj to minBj, "j = 0, . . . ,q. In other words,
maxMð~P ðAÞÞ ¼
Xq
j¼0
mjmaxBj; minMð~P ðAÞÞ ¼
Xq
j¼0
mjminBj:
These two values respectively coincide with P*(A) and P*(A), as we observe in Eqs. (21)
and (22). On the other hand, Mð~PðAÞÞ is convex (the mean value of any fuzzy number
is convex.) Hence, it coincides with the closed interval [P*(A),P
*(A)]. h
The intuitive meaning of this last result is similar to the interpretation of the result given
in Theorem 5.2.
7. A general setting for joint possibility–probability propagation
In this section, a more general dependence setting is assumed that encompasses the
third scenario of the motivating example as a particular case. Let us consider again a
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p1, . . . ,pm. In other words, X is a ‘‘simple’’ mapping, X ¼
Pm
i¼1xiICi , where {C1, . . . ,Cm} is
a partition of X and P(Ci) = pi, "i = 1, . . . ,m. Assume that we have imprecise information
about a random variable Y : X! R and it is also represented by a possibility distribution
p. But now, this possibility distribution is obtained as follows: let us consider another par-
tition of X, {D0, . . . ,Dq}. For each x 2 Dj, we know that Y(x) belongs to the set Aj. Then,
the information about Y is determined by the random set CY : X! R deﬁned as
C(x) = Aj, "x 2 Dj, j = 0, . . . ,q. (All we know about Y is that it is a measurable selection
of CY). The upper probability of CY is associated to the mass assignment mCY :
mCY ðAjÞ ¼ P ðDjÞ; j ¼ 0; . . . ; q:
If, in addition, the images of CY are nested sets, A0 ¼ R  A1      Aq, then this upper
probability is a possibility measure. In this case, all we know about PY is that it is dom-
inated by this possibility measure.
The main assumption in this model is that the pair (X(x),Y(x)) is generated by a single
occurrence x, and the information about it is in the form of a random set CX,Y such that if
x 2 Ci \ Dj then CX,Y(x) = {xi} · Aj. Let T be the random variable given by T(x) =
f(X(x),Y(x)), "x 2 X.
Under these conditions, all we know about the random variable T ¼ f ðX ; Y Þ : X! R is
that it is a selection of the random set CT : X! PðRÞ deﬁned as
CT ðxÞ ¼ f ðX ðxÞ;CðxÞÞ ¼ ff ðX ðxÞ; Y ðxÞÞ : Y ðxÞ 2 CðxÞ; 8x 2 Xg:
The basic mass assignment of CT assigns, to each focal Tij = f(xi,Dj), the mass
mCT ðT ijÞ ¼ PðCi \ DjÞ; 8i; j:
This mass assignment is associated to the plausibility function:
PlCT ðAÞ ¼
Xm
i¼1
X
j:f ðxi ;AjÞ\A6¼;
pij; ð23Þ
where pij = P(Ci \ Dj), "i, j. Under the available information, PlCT is the most precise
upper probability that dominates PT.
Note that
Pm
i¼1pij ¼ mCY ðAjÞ; 8j and
Pq
j¼0pij ¼ pi; 8i. In practice, only the marginals of
the joint mass assignment are known [12], because no assumption is made about the rela-
tionship between the observation processes. If, in particular, observations Ci and Dj are
independent (hence the sets always intersect), "i, j then, this model reduces to the one
given in Section 4. It corresponds to the case where both pieces of information about X
and Y are independent of one another. In any other case, the plausibility PlCT does not
dominate, neither dominates the plausibility measure considered in Section 4. Conversely,
if Ci = Di, "i, and pi ¼ mCY ðAiÞ; 8i, then we recover the scenario of total dependence of
sources of information in case (c) of the motivating example.
Actually, we used neither the fact that PlCY is a possibility measure, nor that X is a pure
random variable, to build this last propagation model. Thus, when both pieces of informa-
tion CX and CY about X and Y are arbitrary random sets (whose respective images are not
necessarily nested) the plausibility measure PlCT is still given by formula (23), where the
argument of the summation is replaced by f(Xi,Aj) \ A5 ;, and Xi is an imprecisely per-
ceived realization of X. This is the framework already proposed by Dubois and Prade [14]
for encompassing both the calculus of random variables (when X and Y are independent
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known quantities described by possibility distributions, whose dependence is not known,
but that are informed by fully dependent sources). This is also the framework more
recently adopted by Krieger and Held [25] in the study of climate prediction, using the ter-
minology of belief functions for the propagation of imprecise cumulative distribution
functions.
8. Conclusion and open problems
This paper tries to provide some interpretative and formal foundations to some tech-
niques of uncertainty propagation that were used in risk assessment by various authors
(Guyonnet et al [21], Ferson and Ginzburg [19], Baudrit [1], Fetz and Oberguggenberger
[17], Krieger and Held [25], and others) for combining incomplete and random pieces of
information. Our approach encompasses several dependence assumptions between ill-
known quantities. Assuming independence between sources of information yields a result
consisting of a belief function (or a random set) which averages the fuzzy random variable
that is produced from a function having as arguments random variables and fuzzy intervals.
The higher order model described in Section 5.1 is more faithful to the actual information
and does not keep imprecision and randomness separate, since it gives a fuzzy-interval-
valued probability. The aggregated model in Section 4 does not destroy all higher order
information in the end since an interval-valued probability still displays information in
terms of frequency (in the case of objective variability) and amount of subjective ignorance.
We pointed out that using a possibility measure to describe our knowledge about an ill-
known quantity presupposes nothing about the nature of this quantity: it can be an ill-
known random variable as described by an expert or observed from an imperfect statistical
experiment, or it can refer to a ﬁxed ill-known quantity. We studied the joint propagation
of probability and possibility under this multiple-facetted view. If Y is an ill-known ran-
dom variable, then the knowledge about Y, when provided by a human expert, generally
does not depend on the occurrences of other random variables. However, knowing that Y
is a ﬁxed quantity has useful impact on the propagation process: If X is a known random
variable and Y a ﬁxed quantity, then we know that Y does not depend on X (as in scenario
(b) of the motivating example), a piece of information that further reduces the uncertainty
of the result.
Future works should try to further formalize notions of independence in the presence of
variability and imprecision. It is clear that in a pure probabilistic approach it is not very
convenient to formally distinguish between independent variables and independent obser-
vations of these variables (unless resorting to very complex higher order probability
approaches). The framework of random sets in the sense of Dempster [9] (in terms of prob-
ability bounds) and the notion of uncertain evidence by Shafer [32] make it possible to lay
bare this important distinction. Clarifying these issues, following the works of Couso et al.
[7], Ben Yaghlane et al. [37], and Cozman [8], is an important line of further research.
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